lincolnjfinch asked: What's the transcendence/immanence distinction? If one googles those words with "Agamben" one sees a nice little diagram. This is frustratingly both interesting and unclear.

givemeabody:

sterwood:

Ah jeez, even I don’t get this most of the time.

Immanence has to do with a kind of understanding that doesn’t depart from the way an object is in the world, where transcendence focuses more on the grounds that make such an object, or experience, possible.

For example, classically the transcendent cause of humans was God, while immanent views tended to be more secular. This is (part of) why Spinoza, while having a philosophy focused on God and it’s modes, was often called an atheist: he presented an immanent view of God that was equal with Nature and Substance, so that God was basically an abstraction from everyday objects.

But on the current usage, I couldn’t tell you much. The focus on immanence seems to be a code word for a focus on the secular because of how tied together religion and transcendence are. But this seems like a really bad way if going about things to me, since I don’t see anything inherently religious about transcendence or vice-versa (e.g. Spinoza, again). And that’s why the distinction seems so muddled today: it’s less about the primary distinction between the two terms and more about the confused political histories of them - hence why claiming to be an ‘immanent philosopher’ seems like more of a political claim than a strictly philosophical one.

If anyone else can help out here though, I’d be more than happy.

Yes, for Deleuze and for Guattari every body of thought has its own plane of immanence, meaning there is some place from which concepts originate, they are not handed down ready made, they must be constructed. Following Bergson, Deleuze argues that classical philosophy described a Whole - a closed and eternal system, he says that modern philosophy must think the Open - a system that is time-based, always giving rise to new concepts. I think this is the politics that underlies immanence for many of these contemporary thinkers - they are trying to think the Open. The philosophers Deleuze writes about, for instance, are thinkers who — as somebody has already remarked — made an immanent God equal to nature and even thinkers for whom an immanent God is equal with pure immanence. A transcendental God would be different from and even outside the universe. 

It might sound a bit like neo-Platonism and I don’t think this would be so far off. They even call the plane of immanence the “One-All.” Thinking materially, immanent here in our interactions are all those coders who keep tumblr (and the internet running) from the location the servers are stored to the time that went behind creating the font I’m typing with and much more — infinitely more. 

(all this is taken from the first chapter of Laura Marks’ book Enfoldment and Infinity, none of this is original to me! I’ve just really condensed her material)

this all seems fairly accurate except for the (somewhat common) charge of neo-Platonism, which I never understood apart from the somewhat superficial resemblance of the term “One-All” to the “One.” It’s pretty clear that Deleuze’s entire project is situated against Platonism (/any form of pure idealism) given his emphasis on matter over form (and the argument that concepts are not ready-made is also an anti-platonist one). The One-All is simply the eternal return, or the movement of difference and repetition itself. The plane of immanence is the One-All in the sense that is is the (un)grounding of this movement. And unlike Spinoza’s substance, the plane is not a mystical source, but a singular and yet impersonal life. 

@6 months ago with 31 notes
#Deleuze 

"…not only does [the virtual object] lack something in relation to the real object from which it is subtracted, it lacks something in itself, since it is always half of itself, the other half being different as well as absent. This absence, as we shall see, is the opposite of a negative. Eternal half of itself, it is where it is only on condition that it is not where it should be. It is where we find it only on condition that we search for it where it is not. It is at once not possessed by those who have it and had by those who do not possess it. It is always a ‘was.’ In this sense, Lacan’s pages assimilating the virtual object to Edgar Allan Poe’s purloined letter seem to us exemplary. Lacan shows that real objects are subjected to the law of being or not being somewhere, by virtue of the reality principle, whereas virtual objects, by contrast, have the property of being and not being where they are, wherever they go…
virtual objects exist only as fragments of themselves: they are found only as lost; they exist only as recovered. Loss or forgetting here are not determinations which must be overcome; rather, they refer to the objective nature of that which we recover, as lost, at the heart of forgetting."

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition
@8 months ago with 31 notes
#Deleuze #difference and repetition #lacan #psychoanalysis #the phallus 

"These thousands of habits of which we are composed—theses contractions, contemplations, pretensions, presumptions, satisfactions, fatigues; these variable presents—thus form the basic domain of passive synthesis. The passive self is not defined simply by receptivity—that is, by means of the capacity to experience sensations—but by virtue of the contractile contemplation which constitutes the organism itself before it constitutes sensations. This self, therefore, is by no means simple: it is not enough to relativise or pluralise the self, all the while retaining for it a simple attenuated form. Selves are larval subjects; the world of passive synthesis constitutes the system of the self, under conditions yet to be determined, but it is the system of a dissolved self. There is a self wherever a furtive contemplation has been established, whenever a contracting machine capable of drawing a difference from repetition functions somewhere. The self does not undergo modifications, it is itself a modification."

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition
@9 months ago with 43 notes
#also this #Deleuze #difference and repetition #d&r summer #habit #larval subjects 

"Being ‘corresponds’ to the essence of the problem or the question as such. it is as though there were an ‘opening’, a ‘gap’, an ontological ‘fold’ which relates being and the question to one another. In this relation, being is difference itself. Being is also non-being, but non-being is not the being of the negative; rather it is the being of the problematic, the being of problem and question. Difference is not the negative; on the contrary, non-being is Difference. For this reason non-being should rather be written (non)-being or, better still, ?-being…This (non)-being is the differential element in which affirmation, as multiple affirmation, finds the principle of its genesis. As for negation, this is only the shadow of the highest principle, the shadow of the difference alongside the affirmation produced. Once we confuse (non)-being with the negative, contradiction is inevitably carried into being; but contradiction is only the appearance or the epiphenomenon, the illusion projected by the problem, the shadow of a question which remains open and of a being which corresponds as such to that question."

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition
@9 months ago with 9 notes
#Deleuze #difference and repetition #d&r summer 

"That identity not be first, that it exist as a principle but as a second principle, as a principle become; that it revolve around the Different: such would be the nature of a Copernican revolution which opens up the possibility of difference having its own concept, rather than being maintained under the domination of a concept in general already understood as identical. Nietzsche meant nothing more than this by eternal return. Eternal return cannot mean the return of the identical because it presupposes a world (that of the will to power) in which all previous identities have been abolished and dissolved. Returning is being, but only the being of becoming. The eternal return does not bring back ‘the same’, but returning constitutes the only Same of that which becomes. Returning is the becoming-identical of being itself. Returning is thus the only identity, but identity as a secondary power; the identity of difference, the identitical which belongs to the different, or turns around the different. Such and identity, produced by difference, is determined as ‘repetition.’ Repetition in the eternal return, therefore, consists in conceiving the same on the basis of the different…In all these respects, eternal return is the univocity of being, the effective realisation of that univocity…Being is said in a single and same sense, but this sense is that of eternal return as the return or repetition of that of which it is said. The wheel in the eternal return is at once both production of repetition on the basis of difference and selection of difference on the basis of repetition."

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition

If Badiou and Zizek understood that the movement of the eternal return is itself the expression of the univocity of being (and the only thing that is the “same”/”One-All” is the “return” or movement of difference-repetition) they could have avoided writing their worst books.

@9 months ago with 29 notes
#deleuze #difference and repetition #d&r summer #badiou #zizek #univocity #eternal return #nietzsche 

questions/notes on Difference and Repetition (preface)

Can we tease out Deleuze’s understanding of empiricism as “a mysticism and a mathematicism of concepts, but precisely one which treats the concept as object of an encounter, as a here and now…” (xx)? Consider the way he characterizes his project as a “transcendental empiricism” (rather than the transcendental idealism of Kant), as an empiricism that is not a “simple appeal to lived experience” (and therefore not a “phenomenology”) but a “creation of concepts…from an always decentered centre, from an always displaced periphery which repeats and differenciates them” (xxi)? Here the creation of concepts does not originate from the inside (consciousness of subject), nor from the outside (traditionally empiricist approach to an object), but from an “in-between” that is always displaced (as an aside, there seems to be a lot of correlation here with Derrida’s work: an origin that is neither given nor “original” but a movement of difference—for Deleuze, repetition). As such, Deleuze, following Nietzsche, characterizes philosophy as “untimely”—“signifying as once the originary ‘nowhere’ and the displaced, disguised, modified and always re-created ‘here and now’. Neither empirical particularities nor abstract universals: a Cogito for a dissolved self. We believe in a world in which individuations are impersonal, and singularities are pre-individual: the splendor of the pronoun ‘one’” (xxi). How is GD’s account of “a cogito for a dissolved self” different from other “structural” accounts of the subject (I have in mind particularly Lacan’s “split subject”)? 

@10 months ago with 11 notes
#Deleuze #D&Rsummer 

"Repetition is constituted not from one present to another, but between the two coexistent series that these presents form in function of the virtual object (object= x). It is because this object constantly circulates, always displaced in relation to itself, that it determines transformations of terms and modifications of imaginary relations within the two real series in which it appears, and therefore between the two presents. The displacement of the virtual object is not, therefore, one disguise among others, but the principle from which, in reality, repetition follows in the form of disguised repetition. Repetition is constituted only with and through the disguises which affect the terms and relations of the real series, but it is so because it depends upon the virtual object as an immanent instance which operates above all by displacement. In consequence, we cannot suppose that disguise may be explained by repression. On the contrary, it is because repetition is necessarily disguised, by virtue of the characteristic displacement of it determinant principle, that repression occurs in the form of a consequence in regard to the representation of presents…WE DO NOT REPEAT BECAUSE WE REPRESS, WE REPRESS BECAUSE WE REPEAT. Moreover—which amounts to the same thing—we do not disguise because we repress, we repress because we disguise, and we disguise by virtue of the determinant centre of repetition. Repetition is no more secondary in relation to a supposed ultimate or originary fixed term than disguise is secondary in relation to repetition. For if the two presents, the former and the present one, form two series which coexist in the function of the virtual object which is displaced in them and in relation to itself, neither of these two series can any longer be designated as the original or the derived. They put a variety of terms and subjects into play in a complex intersubjectivity in which each subject owes its role and function in the series to the timeless position that it occupies in relation to the virtual object. As for this object itself, it can no longer be treated as an ultimate or original term: this would be to assign it a fixed place and an identity repugnant to its whole nature. If it can be ‘identified’ with the phallus, this is only to the extent that the latter, in Lacan’s terms, is always missing from its place, from its own identity and from its representation. In short, THERE IS NO ULTIMATE TERM—OUR LOVES DO NOT REFER BACK TO THE MOTHER; it is simply that the mother occupies a certain place in relation to the virtual object in the series which constitutes our present…the parental characters are not the ultimate terms of individual subject hood but the middle terms of an intersubjectivity, forms of communication and disguise from one series to another for different subjects, to the extent that these forms are determined by the displacement of the virtual object. Behind the masks, therefore, are further masks, and even the most hidden is still a hiding place, and so on to infinity. THE ONLY ILLUSION IS THAT OF UNMASKING SOMETHING OR SOMEONE."

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition

context for that one-liner. I just typed out this whole page for you guys because it’s THAT GOOD [caps/emphasis mine above].

@8 months ago with 57 notes
#deleuze #difference and repetition #lacan #psychoanalysis 

"Underneath the self which acts are little selves which contemplate and which render possible both the action and the active subject. We speak of ‘self’ only in virtue of these thousands of little witnesses which contemplate within us: it is always a third party who says ‘me’."

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition
@9 months ago with 124 notes
#again he sounds like derrida #deleuze #difference and repetition #d&r summer 

"

Philosophical reflection may be able to provide another angle on habits. It does not help us to order or regulate habits, for the goal of philosophy is not the transformation of behaviour so much as the creation of concepts which may or may not address any particular form of behaviour. It may thus be able to discern another dimension to habits than those that make habit the object of social manipulation. Habit is one of the modes of connection that link living beings to a world which is open to innovative behaviour: it is the link that bridges the relations between the organic and the inorganic, introducing the needs of the organism to its environment and inserting its environment into the behaviour of the organism.


Habit deserves to be understood not simply as one of the objects of social regulation, the attainment of good habits and the elimination of bad habits; it deserves to have its ontological place restored, to have this rich lineage which produced it as a philosophical concept continued into the future. Understanding habit in terms beyond automatism implies a new understanding of the inorganic universe and a new understanding of its processes of generating, supporting and moving towards the organic, its becoming-brain. This is what we have inherited from the 19th and 20th centuries, and what presses on us now: an understanding of the inter-implications of forms of life with inorganic forces, the processes by which the universe comes to contemplate itself.

"

grosz 2013 habit today body & society 19 (2-3) 217-239 (via plasmodiocarp)

She’s riffing off Deleuze here in the best way possible:

Passive synthesis is of the latter kind: it constitutes our habit of living, our expectation that ‘it’ will continue, that one of the two elements will appear after the other, thereby assuring the perpetuation of our case. When we say that habit is a contraction we are speaking not of an instantaneous action which combines with another to form an element of repetition but rather of the fusion of that repetition in the contemplating ming. A soul must be attributed to the heart, to the muscles, nerves and cells, but a contemplative soul whole entire function is to contract habit. This is no mystical or barbarous hypothesis. On the contrary, habit here manifests its full generality: it concerns not only the sensory-motor habits that we have (psychologically), but also, before these, the primary habits that we are; the thousands of passive synthesis of which we are organically composed…What organism is not made of elements and cases of repetition, of contemplated and contracted water, nitrogen, carbon, chlorides and sulphates, thereby interwining all the habits of which it is composed?…The living present, and with it the whole of organic and psychic life, rests upon habit…

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition

(via givemeabody)

@9 months ago with 14 notes
#deleuze #elizabeth grosz #difference and repetition #habit 

"There is a crucial experience of difference and a corresponding experiment; each time we find ourselves confronted or bound by a limitation or an opposition, we should ask what such a situation presupposes. It presupposes a swarm of differences, a pluralism of free, wild or untamed differences, a properly differential and original space and time; all of which persist alongside the simplification of limitation and opposition…our claim is not only that difference in itself is not ‘already’ contradiction, but that it cannot be reduced or traced back to contradiction, since the latter is not more but less profound than difference. On what condition is difference traced or projected on to a flat space? Precisely when it has been forced into a previously established identity, when it has been placed on the slope of the identical which makes it reflect or desire identity, and necessarily takes it where identity wants to go—namely, into the negative…the negative and negativity do not even capture the phenomenon of difference, only the phantom or the epiphenomenon. The whole of Phenomenology is an epiphenomenology"

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition

killin it

@9 months ago with 34 notes
#Deleuze #difference and repetition #d&r summer #hegel #phenomenology 

"In effect, difference ceases to be reflexive and recovers an effectively real concept only to the extent that it designates catastrophes: either breaks of continuity in the series of resemblances or impassable fissures between the analogical structures. It ceases to be reflexive only in order to become catastrophic. No doubt it cannot be the one without the other. But does not difference as catastrophe precisely bear witness to an irreducible ground which continues to act under the apparent equilibrium of organic representation?"

let’s play a game: Who Said It, Deleuze or Derrida?
@9 months ago with 11 notes
#Deleuze #difference and repetition #d&r summer 

"Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are among those who bring to philosophy a new means of expression. Furthermore, in all their work, movement is at issue. Their objection to Hegel is that he does not go beyond false movement – in other words, the abstract logical movement of ‘mediation’. They want to put metaphysics in motion, in action. They want to make it act, and make it carry out immediate acts. It is not enough, therefore, for them to propose a new representation of movement; representation is already mediation. Rather, it is a question of producing within the work a movement capable of affecting the mind outside of all representation; it is a question of making movement itself a work, without interposition; of substituting direct signs for mediate rep-resentations; of inventing vibrations, rotations, whirlings, gravitations, dances or leaps which directly touch the mind."

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition

philosophy (“of the future”/untimely) should not merely represent things via concepts, it should do something, enact affects rather than effects, movement rather than mediation.

@10 months ago with 62 notes
#Deleuze #kierkegaard #nietzsche #hegel #D&Rsummer 

lincolnjfinch asked: What's the transcendence/immanence distinction? If one googles those words with "Agamben" one sees a nice little diagram. This is frustratingly both interesting and unclear.

givemeabody:

sterwood:

Ah jeez, even I don’t get this most of the time.

Immanence has to do with a kind of understanding that doesn’t depart from the way an object is in the world, where transcendence focuses more on the grounds that make such an object, or experience, possible.

For example, classically the transcendent cause of humans was God, while immanent views tended to be more secular. This is (part of) why Spinoza, while having a philosophy focused on God and it’s modes, was often called an atheist: he presented an immanent view of God that was equal with Nature and Substance, so that God was basically an abstraction from everyday objects.

But on the current usage, I couldn’t tell you much. The focus on immanence seems to be a code word for a focus on the secular because of how tied together religion and transcendence are. But this seems like a really bad way if going about things to me, since I don’t see anything inherently religious about transcendence or vice-versa (e.g. Spinoza, again). And that’s why the distinction seems so muddled today: it’s less about the primary distinction between the two terms and more about the confused political histories of them - hence why claiming to be an ‘immanent philosopher’ seems like more of a political claim than a strictly philosophical one.

If anyone else can help out here though, I’d be more than happy.

Yes, for Deleuze and for Guattari every body of thought has its own plane of immanence, meaning there is some place from which concepts originate, they are not handed down ready made, they must be constructed. Following Bergson, Deleuze argues that classical philosophy described a Whole - a closed and eternal system, he says that modern philosophy must think the Open - a system that is time-based, always giving rise to new concepts. I think this is the politics that underlies immanence for many of these contemporary thinkers - they are trying to think the Open. The philosophers Deleuze writes about, for instance, are thinkers who — as somebody has already remarked — made an immanent God equal to nature and even thinkers for whom an immanent God is equal with pure immanence. A transcendental God would be different from and even outside the universe. 

It might sound a bit like neo-Platonism and I don’t think this would be so far off. They even call the plane of immanence the “One-All.” Thinking materially, immanent here in our interactions are all those coders who keep tumblr (and the internet running) from the location the servers are stored to the time that went behind creating the font I’m typing with and much more — infinitely more. 

(all this is taken from the first chapter of Laura Marks’ book Enfoldment and Infinity, none of this is original to me! I’ve just really condensed her material)

this all seems fairly accurate except for the (somewhat common) charge of neo-Platonism, which I never understood apart from the somewhat superficial resemblance of the term “One-All” to the “One.” It’s pretty clear that Deleuze’s entire project is situated against Platonism (/any form of pure idealism) given his emphasis on matter over form (and the argument that concepts are not ready-made is also an anti-platonist one). The One-All is simply the eternal return, or the movement of difference and repetition itself. The plane of immanence is the One-All in the sense that is is the (un)grounding of this movement. And unlike Spinoza’s substance, the plane is not a mystical source, but a singular and yet impersonal life. 

6 months ago
#Deleuze 
"Repetition is constituted not from one present to another, but between the two coexistent series that these presents form in function of the virtual object (object= x). It is because this object constantly circulates, always displaced in relation to itself, that it determines transformations of terms and modifications of imaginary relations within the two real series in which it appears, and therefore between the two presents. The displacement of the virtual object is not, therefore, one disguise among others, but the principle from which, in reality, repetition follows in the form of disguised repetition. Repetition is constituted only with and through the disguises which affect the terms and relations of the real series, but it is so because it depends upon the virtual object as an immanent instance which operates above all by displacement. In consequence, we cannot suppose that disguise may be explained by repression. On the contrary, it is because repetition is necessarily disguised, by virtue of the characteristic displacement of it determinant principle, that repression occurs in the form of a consequence in regard to the representation of presents…WE DO NOT REPEAT BECAUSE WE REPRESS, WE REPRESS BECAUSE WE REPEAT. Moreover—which amounts to the same thing—we do not disguise because we repress, we repress because we disguise, and we disguise by virtue of the determinant centre of repetition. Repetition is no more secondary in relation to a supposed ultimate or originary fixed term than disguise is secondary in relation to repetition. For if the two presents, the former and the present one, form two series which coexist in the function of the virtual object which is displaced in them and in relation to itself, neither of these two series can any longer be designated as the original or the derived. They put a variety of terms and subjects into play in a complex intersubjectivity in which each subject owes its role and function in the series to the timeless position that it occupies in relation to the virtual object. As for this object itself, it can no longer be treated as an ultimate or original term: this would be to assign it a fixed place and an identity repugnant to its whole nature. If it can be ‘identified’ with the phallus, this is only to the extent that the latter, in Lacan’s terms, is always missing from its place, from its own identity and from its representation. In short, THERE IS NO ULTIMATE TERM—OUR LOVES DO NOT REFER BACK TO THE MOTHER; it is simply that the mother occupies a certain place in relation to the virtual object in the series which constitutes our present…the parental characters are not the ultimate terms of individual subject hood but the middle terms of an intersubjectivity, forms of communication and disguise from one series to another for different subjects, to the extent that these forms are determined by the displacement of the virtual object. Behind the masks, therefore, are further masks, and even the most hidden is still a hiding place, and so on to infinity. THE ONLY ILLUSION IS THAT OF UNMASKING SOMETHING OR SOMEONE."

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition

context for that one-liner. I just typed out this whole page for you guys because it’s THAT GOOD [caps/emphasis mine above].

8 months ago
#deleuze #difference and repetition #lacan #psychoanalysis 
"…not only does [the virtual object] lack something in relation to the real object from which it is subtracted, it lacks something in itself, since it is always half of itself, the other half being different as well as absent. This absence, as we shall see, is the opposite of a negative. Eternal half of itself, it is where it is only on condition that it is not where it should be. It is where we find it only on condition that we search for it where it is not. It is at once not possessed by those who have it and had by those who do not possess it. It is always a ‘was.’ In this sense, Lacan’s pages assimilating the virtual object to Edgar Allan Poe’s purloined letter seem to us exemplary. Lacan shows that real objects are subjected to the law of being or not being somewhere, by virtue of the reality principle, whereas virtual objects, by contrast, have the property of being and not being where they are, wherever they go…
virtual objects exist only as fragments of themselves: they are found only as lost; they exist only as recovered. Loss or forgetting here are not determinations which must be overcome; rather, they refer to the objective nature of that which we recover, as lost, at the heart of forgetting."
Deleuze, Difference and Repetition
8 months ago
#Deleuze #difference and repetition #lacan #psychoanalysis #the phallus 
"Underneath the self which acts are little selves which contemplate and which render possible both the action and the active subject. We speak of ‘self’ only in virtue of these thousands of little witnesses which contemplate within us: it is always a third party who says ‘me’."
Deleuze, Difference and Repetition
9 months ago
#again he sounds like derrida #deleuze #difference and repetition #d&r summer 
"These thousands of habits of which we are composed—theses contractions, contemplations, pretensions, presumptions, satisfactions, fatigues; these variable presents—thus form the basic domain of passive synthesis. The passive self is not defined simply by receptivity—that is, by means of the capacity to experience sensations—but by virtue of the contractile contemplation which constitutes the organism itself before it constitutes sensations. This self, therefore, is by no means simple: it is not enough to relativise or pluralise the self, all the while retaining for it a simple attenuated form. Selves are larval subjects; the world of passive synthesis constitutes the system of the self, under conditions yet to be determined, but it is the system of a dissolved self. There is a self wherever a furtive contemplation has been established, whenever a contracting machine capable of drawing a difference from repetition functions somewhere. The self does not undergo modifications, it is itself a modification."
Deleuze, Difference and Repetition
9 months ago
#also this #Deleuze #difference and repetition #d&r summer #habit #larval subjects 
"

Philosophical reflection may be able to provide another angle on habits. It does not help us to order or regulate habits, for the goal of philosophy is not the transformation of behaviour so much as the creation of concepts which may or may not address any particular form of behaviour. It may thus be able to discern another dimension to habits than those that make habit the object of social manipulation. Habit is one of the modes of connection that link living beings to a world which is open to innovative behaviour: it is the link that bridges the relations between the organic and the inorganic, introducing the needs of the organism to its environment and inserting its environment into the behaviour of the organism.


Habit deserves to be understood not simply as one of the objects of social regulation, the attainment of good habits and the elimination of bad habits; it deserves to have its ontological place restored, to have this rich lineage which produced it as a philosophical concept continued into the future. Understanding habit in terms beyond automatism implies a new understanding of the inorganic universe and a new understanding of its processes of generating, supporting and moving towards the organic, its becoming-brain. This is what we have inherited from the 19th and 20th centuries, and what presses on us now: an understanding of the inter-implications of forms of life with inorganic forces, the processes by which the universe comes to contemplate itself.

"

grosz 2013 habit today body & society 19 (2-3) 217-239 (via plasmodiocarp)

She’s riffing off Deleuze here in the best way possible:

Passive synthesis is of the latter kind: it constitutes our habit of living, our expectation that ‘it’ will continue, that one of the two elements will appear after the other, thereby assuring the perpetuation of our case. When we say that habit is a contraction we are speaking not of an instantaneous action which combines with another to form an element of repetition but rather of the fusion of that repetition in the contemplating ming. A soul must be attributed to the heart, to the muscles, nerves and cells, but a contemplative soul whole entire function is to contract habit. This is no mystical or barbarous hypothesis. On the contrary, habit here manifests its full generality: it concerns not only the sensory-motor habits that we have (psychologically), but also, before these, the primary habits that we are; the thousands of passive synthesis of which we are organically composed…What organism is not made of elements and cases of repetition, of contemplated and contracted water, nitrogen, carbon, chlorides and sulphates, thereby interwining all the habits of which it is composed?…The living present, and with it the whole of organic and psychic life, rests upon habit…

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition

(via givemeabody)

9 months ago
#deleuze #elizabeth grosz #difference and repetition #habit 
"Being ‘corresponds’ to the essence of the problem or the question as such. it is as though there were an ‘opening’, a ‘gap’, an ontological ‘fold’ which relates being and the question to one another. In this relation, being is difference itself. Being is also non-being, but non-being is not the being of the negative; rather it is the being of the problematic, the being of problem and question. Difference is not the negative; on the contrary, non-being is Difference. For this reason non-being should rather be written (non)-being or, better still, ?-being…This (non)-being is the differential element in which affirmation, as multiple affirmation, finds the principle of its genesis. As for negation, this is only the shadow of the highest principle, the shadow of the difference alongside the affirmation produced. Once we confuse (non)-being with the negative, contradiction is inevitably carried into being; but contradiction is only the appearance or the epiphenomenon, the illusion projected by the problem, the shadow of a question which remains open and of a being which corresponds as such to that question."
Deleuze, Difference and Repetition
9 months ago
#Deleuze #difference and repetition #d&r summer 
"There is a crucial experience of difference and a corresponding experiment; each time we find ourselves confronted or bound by a limitation or an opposition, we should ask what such a situation presupposes. It presupposes a swarm of differences, a pluralism of free, wild or untamed differences, a properly differential and original space and time; all of which persist alongside the simplification of limitation and opposition…our claim is not only that difference in itself is not ‘already’ contradiction, but that it cannot be reduced or traced back to contradiction, since the latter is not more but less profound than difference. On what condition is difference traced or projected on to a flat space? Precisely when it has been forced into a previously established identity, when it has been placed on the slope of the identical which makes it reflect or desire identity, and necessarily takes it where identity wants to go—namely, into the negative…the negative and negativity do not even capture the phenomenon of difference, only the phantom or the epiphenomenon. The whole of Phenomenology is an epiphenomenology"

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition

killin it

9 months ago
#Deleuze #difference and repetition #d&r summer #hegel #phenomenology 
"That identity not be first, that it exist as a principle but as a second principle, as a principle become; that it revolve around the Different: such would be the nature of a Copernican revolution which opens up the possibility of difference having its own concept, rather than being maintained under the domination of a concept in general already understood as identical. Nietzsche meant nothing more than this by eternal return. Eternal return cannot mean the return of the identical because it presupposes a world (that of the will to power) in which all previous identities have been abolished and dissolved. Returning is being, but only the being of becoming. The eternal return does not bring back ‘the same’, but returning constitutes the only Same of that which becomes. Returning is the becoming-identical of being itself. Returning is thus the only identity, but identity as a secondary power; the identity of difference, the identitical which belongs to the different, or turns around the different. Such and identity, produced by difference, is determined as ‘repetition.’ Repetition in the eternal return, therefore, consists in conceiving the same on the basis of the different…In all these respects, eternal return is the univocity of being, the effective realisation of that univocity…Being is said in a single and same sense, but this sense is that of eternal return as the return or repetition of that of which it is said. The wheel in the eternal return is at once both production of repetition on the basis of difference and selection of difference on the basis of repetition."

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition

If Badiou and Zizek understood that the movement of the eternal return is itself the expression of the univocity of being (and the only thing that is the “same”/”One-All” is the “return” or movement of difference-repetition) they could have avoided writing their worst books.

9 months ago
#deleuze #difference and repetition #d&r summer #badiou #zizek #univocity #eternal return #nietzsche 
"In effect, difference ceases to be reflexive and recovers an effectively real concept only to the extent that it designates catastrophes: either breaks of continuity in the series of resemblances or impassable fissures between the analogical structures. It ceases to be reflexive only in order to become catastrophic. No doubt it cannot be the one without the other. But does not difference as catastrophe precisely bear witness to an irreducible ground which continues to act under the apparent equilibrium of organic representation?"
let’s play a game: Who Said It, Deleuze or Derrida?
9 months ago
#Deleuze #difference and repetition #d&r summer 
questions/notes on Difference and Repetition (preface)

Can we tease out Deleuze’s understanding of empiricism as “a mysticism and a mathematicism of concepts, but precisely one which treats the concept as object of an encounter, as a here and now…” (xx)? Consider the way he characterizes his project as a “transcendental empiricism” (rather than the transcendental idealism of Kant), as an empiricism that is not a “simple appeal to lived experience” (and therefore not a “phenomenology”) but a “creation of concepts…from an always decentered centre, from an always displaced periphery which repeats and differenciates them” (xxi)? Here the creation of concepts does not originate from the inside (consciousness of subject), nor from the outside (traditionally empiricist approach to an object), but from an “in-between” that is always displaced (as an aside, there seems to be a lot of correlation here with Derrida’s work: an origin that is neither given nor “original” but a movement of difference—for Deleuze, repetition). As such, Deleuze, following Nietzsche, characterizes philosophy as “untimely”—“signifying as once the originary ‘nowhere’ and the displaced, disguised, modified and always re-created ‘here and now’. Neither empirical particularities nor abstract universals: a Cogito for a dissolved self. We believe in a world in which individuations are impersonal, and singularities are pre-individual: the splendor of the pronoun ‘one’” (xxi). How is GD’s account of “a cogito for a dissolved self” different from other “structural” accounts of the subject (I have in mind particularly Lacan’s “split subject”)? 

10 months ago
#Deleuze #D&Rsummer 
"Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are among those who bring to philosophy a new means of expression. Furthermore, in all their work, movement is at issue. Their objection to Hegel is that he does not go beyond false movement – in other words, the abstract logical movement of ‘mediation’. They want to put metaphysics in motion, in action. They want to make it act, and make it carry out immediate acts. It is not enough, therefore, for them to propose a new representation of movement; representation is already mediation. Rather, it is a question of producing within the work a movement capable of affecting the mind outside of all representation; it is a question of making movement itself a work, without interposition; of substituting direct signs for mediate rep-resentations; of inventing vibrations, rotations, whirlings, gravitations, dances or leaps which directly touch the mind."

Deleuze, Difference and Repetition

philosophy (“of the future”/untimely) should not merely represent things via concepts, it should do something, enact affects rather than effects, movement rather than mediation.

10 months ago
#Deleuze #kierkegaard #nietzsche #hegel #D&Rsummer